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Introduction
Since Meese and Rogoff (1983) reported a lack of explanatory power of exchange rate models, economic studies frequently show that it is notoriously difficult to forecast exchange rate fluctuations by means of structural economic models. This is especially true with regard to exchange rates of emerging market countries. A characteristic features of exchange rates of emerging market countries is that they witness large fluctuations and often eruptive jumps. Large fluctuations and eruptive jumps of exchange rates constitute a major challenge to policymakers, international investors, and international firms in emerging countries. Given the poor forecasting performance of structural economic models, survey data of exchange rate forecasts of professional economists have widely been studied as an alternative source of information for forecasting exchange rates. Many researchers, however, have reported that survey data of exchange rate forecasts violate traditional criteria of forecast rationality (for a survey, see MacDonald 2000) . Violation of traditional criteria of forecast rationality, in turn, gives rise to doubts as to the usefulness of survey data for forecasting exchange rates.
Traditional criteria of forecast rationality are based on the assumption that forecasters have a symmetric (quadratic) loss function. Patton and Timmermann (2007) argue that invoking the assumption of a symmetric loss function could be problematic for traditional rationality tests if, in fact, forecasters have an asymmetric loss function. It has been well-known for quite a while that there are good reasons to argue that loss functions are not symmetric (Granger 1969; Granger and Newbold 1986; Zellner 1986; Christoffersen and Diebold 1997, among others) . Recent research provides ample evidence indicating that deviations from 1 a symmetric loss function may be quite common (Elliott et al. 2005; Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis 2008a; Döpke et al. 2010; among others) . Research on asymmetric loss functions estimated on survey data of exchange rate forecasts, however, has started only recently. Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis (2008b) study the exchange rates of the G10 countries. While they report evidence in favor of an asymmetric loss function, they derive their finding using forward exchange rates to measure exchange rate expectations. Another recent study by Pierdzioch et al. (2012) , in contrast, uses survey data of exchange rate forecasts that contain information on the yen/dollar exchange rate forecasts of individual forecasters. Research on asymmetric loss functions that analyzes the properties of survey data of forecasts of emerging market countries at the microeconomic level of individual forecasters is, to the best of our knowledge, not available. The research by Baghestani and Marchon (2012) is an exception insofar as they analyze an asymmetric loss function using forecasts of the Brazilian real, an important emerging market exchange rate. They study forecasts collected from a survey conducted by the Brazilian Central Bank. They do not study, however, exchange rate forecasts at the level of individual forecasters. Rather, their study is restricted to the mean (that is, the consensus) forecast and hence studies the time series characteristics of the survey. Their study does not take the cross-sectional dimension and the cross-sectional heterogeneity of forecasts at the microeconomic level into account.
Our research is a first step to close this gap in the literature. Following Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis (2008b), Baghestani and Marchon (2012) , and Pierdzioch et al. (2012) , we shape our empirical analysis in terms of an approach recently developed by Elliott et al. (2005) to recover the shape of exchange rate forecasters' loss function. This approach is easy to implement, it informs about the type of a potential asymmetry in forecasters' loss function, and it allows the rationality of forecasts under an asymmetric loss function to be tested. We apply the approach advanced by Elliott et al. (2005) to study survey data of forecasts of the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar for the time period 1995 -2009. Our empirical results show a substantial degree of heterogeneity across exchange rate forecasters' with respect to the shape of forecasters' loss function. While a symmetric loss function seems to fit the forecasts of some forecasters, an asymmetric loss function seems to be consistent with forecasts of other forecasters. In line with results reported by Pierdzioch et al. (2012) , our empirical results further show that assuming an asymmetric loss function does not necessarily make survey data of exchange rate forecasts look rational. While, in some cases, an asymmetric loss function remedies apparent deviations from rationality that obtain under a symmetric loss function, this is not a general feature of the data. Importantly, whether an asymmetric loss function makes forecasts look rational in many cases depends on the shape of the assumed loss function. In other words, a single loss function does not fit equally well the forecasts of all forecasters.
Given that the assumed parametrization seems to affect the results of the rationality test advanced by Elliott et al. (2005) , we proceed by analyzing the survey data of exchange rate forecasts using an alternative test that has recently been suggested by Patton and Timmermann (2007) . Their test is more general than the test developed by Elliott et al. (2005) because it does not rest on a specific parametrization of the loss function. The test only assumes under the null hypothesis of forecast rationality that the loss function either only depends on the forecast error or is homogeneous in the forecast error. The test yields sound rejections of the null hypothesis for the majority of forecasters. The test also yields the result that if the exchange rate forecast exceeds (falls short of) the current exchange rate, then the probability that the exchange rate forecast also exceeds (falls short of) the future exchange rate increases. We argue that this result can be interpreted in terms of recent research on forecaster (anti-) herding in foreign exchange markets (Pierdzioch and Stadtmann 2010) .
We organize the reminder of this paper as follows. In Section ??, we briefly outline the approach developed by Elliott et al. (2005) and the rationality test suggested by Patton and Timmermann (2007) . In Section ??, we describe our data and our empirical results.
In Section ??, we offer some concluding remarks.
The Empirical Model: Estimation and Testing
In Section ??, we describe how we estimated the shape of the loss function. In Section ??, we describe how we tested for forecast rationality under the assumption of a specific parametrization of the loss function and under the assumption of an unknown loss function.
Estimation
The approach developed by Elliott et al. (2005) rests on the assumption that the loss function, L, of an exchange rate forecaster can be described in terms of the following general functional form:
4 where s t+1 denotes the realization of the exchange rate, f t+1 , denotes the forecast formed in period t of the realization of the exchange rate in period t + 1, I denotes the indicator function, p = 1 for a lin-lin loss function and p = 2 for a quad-quad loss function, and α ∈ (0, 1) governs the degree of asymmetry of the loss function. In the case of α = 0.5, the loss function is symmetric. For α = 0.5 and p = 2, the loss a forecaster incurs increases in the squared forecast error. For α = 0.5 and p = 1, the loss increases in the absolute forecast error. A value of α > 0.5 represents the case of forecasters' tendency to issue optimistic forecasts (to overpredict relative to the symmetric case). The opposite case -α < 0.5 stands for the case of pessimistic forecasts. Elliott et al. (2005) show that, for a given parameter p, which defines the general functional form of the loss function, the asymmetry parameter, α, can be consistently estimated aŝ Because the resulting weighting matrix of the GMM estimator depends onα, estimation is done iteratively. Testing whetherα differs from α 0 is done by using the following z-test
Testing whether α differs from α 0 is done by using the following z-test
We considered as instruments a constant (Model 1), and a constant and lagged exchange rate (Model 2). Because the survey data that we shall describe in Section ?? below contains forecasts for an unbalanced panel of forecasters, we did not follow Elliott et al. (2005) in using lagged published forecasts as another instrument.
Testing
For the specific parametrization of the loss function outlined in Section ??, Elliott et al. (2005) further prove that a test for rationality of exchange rate forecasts, given a loss function of the lin-lin or a quad-quad type (p = 1, 2), can be performed by computing
where
and d denotes the number of instruments. This is similar to the usual test of over-identifying restrictions in the GMM framework. In the case of a symmetric loss function, the rationality test is given by forecast rationality, it should not be possible to forecast the sign of the forecast error using data that are in the information set of forecasters at the time a forecast is made.
In order to implement the quantile test, we define I t+1 = 1 if s t+1 − f t+1 < 0, and I t+1 = 0 otherwise. As for the information set of forecasters at the time a forecast is made, we consider the wedge between the current exchange rate and the forecast, s t − f t+1 , that is, the forecast of the relative change in the exchange rate. The resulting quantile test can be implemented by estimating the following equation:
where β 0 and β 1 are coefficients to be estimated, and t+1 is a disturbance term. Estimation can be done by ordinary least squares, or by using a qualitative response model.
then the model implies that the future exchange rate tends to fall short of the forecast if the current exchange rate falls short (exceeds) of the forecast, s t < f t+1 . Conversely, if β 1 > 0, the future exchange rate tends to fall short of the forecast if the current exchange rate exceeds (falls short) the forecast, s t < f t+1 .
Empirical Analysis
In order to recover a potential asymmetry in forecasters' loss function, we use survey data on one-month-ahead and three-months-ahead forecasts of the Brazilian real and the -Please insert Figure ? ? about here. -whether forecasts of excess returns predict the sign of future actual returns. In the context of our survey data of exchange rate forecasts, the test can be interpreted as a "test of forecast-error timing". -Please insert of the z-test recover statistically significant deviations from a symmetric loss function for some (but not all) forecasters, whereα > 0.5 for some forecasters, andα < 0.5 for others.
An estimated asymmetry parameter ofα > 0.5 implies that exchange rate forecasters incur a higher loss when they underestimate the future exchange rate than when they overestimate the future exchange rate. An estimated asymmetry parameter ofα < 0.5, in contrast, implies that overestimations are more costly than underestimations. The crosssectional heterogeneity with respect to the estimated asymmetry parameter,α, holds under a lin-lin and under a quad-quad loss function.
-Please include Tables ?? − ?? about here. - Table ? ? − ?? summarize the results of the J test of an asymmetric loss function and forecast rationality. As for one-month-ahead forecasts, the test results indicate, for example, deviations from rationality under an asymmetric loss function for Forecasters No. 6, 7, 12, 15, 16, 18 , and 22 on a ten percent significance level (lin-lin). Interestingly, for
Forecasters No. 5, 11, 13, 14, and 17 forecast rationality can be rejected for symmetric loss but not for asymmetric loss (lin-lin). Table ? ? reports that for the three-months ahead forecasts forecast rationality under an asymmetric lin-lin loss function can only be rejected for four forecasters. For a quad-quad loss function, we observe that forecast rationality can be rejected for 15 forecasters at the one-month horizon and for eight forecasters at a three-month-horizon. Hence, the rejection of forecast rationality depends on the assumed shape of the loss function. The general impression that emerges, thus, is that, in many cases, whether an asymmetry in the shape of the loss function makes forecasts of exchange rate look rational depends on the specific functional form of the assumed loss function.
- 
Concluding Remarks
Our empirical results recover a substantial degree of heterogeneity across forecasters of the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso with respect to the shape of their loss function and the rationality of their forecasts. We have shown that neither an asymmetric loss function nor congruence of forecasts with the criterion of forecast rationality are general features of forecasts. While some forecasters' loss function seems to be quadratic, other forecasters seem to have an asymmetric loss function. Accounting for an asymmetric loss function does not necessarily imply that the hypothesis of rational forecasts cannot be rejected.
Of course, violation of forecast rationality need not reflect that forecasters indeed form irrational forecasts. It may simply be the case that the process of forecasting exchange rates is more complex than implied by the lin-lin or quad-quad loss functions that we have considered in our empirical analysis. For example, strategic interactions among forecasters may lead them to publish forecasts that intentionally deviate from the forecasts of others.
In this respect, it is instructive to interpret the results of the quantile test of forecast rationality in terms of a test of forecaster (anti-)herding recently developed by Bernhardt et al. (2006) . In order to sketch the logic of the test developed by Bernhardt et al. (2006) , it is useful to consider a forecaster who forms an "efficient" (that is, rational) private forecast of the future exchange rate. In terms of Equation (??), a rational private forecast implies that the forecast of the rate of change in the exchange rate should have no explanatory power with respect to the ex-post forecast error, such that we should have
Conversely, a parameter β 1 = 0 indicates forecast inefficiency.
Such forecast inefficiency arises if the eventually published forecast differs from the rational private forecast. One reason for a potential wedge between the private forecast and the published forecast is that the latter is influenced by public information as embedded in, for example, the current exchange rate. In the case of forecaster herding, a forecaster publishes a forecast that "mimics" public information, implying that the published forecast is tilted towards the current exchange rate. If the private forecast exceeds the current exchange rate, s t > f t+1 , the probability increases that the published forecast turns out to be smaller ex post than the actual future exchange rate, s t+1 − f t+1 < 0, requiring
In contrast, if a forecaster anti-herds, the published forecast scatters farther away from the current exchange rate, and the probability that the actual future exchange rate undershoots the forecast, s t+1 −f t+1 < 0, will increase, requiring β 1 < 0, as in our empirical analysis.
In terms of a suggested interpretation, our results thus provide some evidence that forecasters tend to anti-herd. Forecaster anti-herding in foreign exchange markets has also been reported by Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2010) . Forecaster-anti-herding may reflect that forecasters do not only take into account the accuracy of their forecasts, but that they also try to differentiate their forecasts from the forecasts of others. Such forecast differentiation is likely to result in "extreme" forecasts, which may be a source of the cross-sectional heterogeneity of forecasts that we have observed in our empirical analysis. Attempts to differentiate forecasts, in turn, may reflect that forecasters are paid according to their relative forecasting success, as in the model suggested by Laster et al. (1999) . If so, forecast accuracy is not the only argument in forecasters' loss function, implying that the kind of asymmetric loss functions underlying the estimation approach developed by Elliott et al. (2005) may not suffice to model how forecasters form their forecasts. We leave it to future research to explore in detail the links between forecaster anti-herding and empirical tests of asymmetries in forecasters' loss functions. Note: se = standard error, z-test = test of the null hypothesis thatα = 0.5. The instruments used are the following: a constant (Model 1), a constant and the lagged exchange rate (Model 2). Note: se = standard error, z-test = test of the null hypothesis thatα = 0.5. The instruments used are the following: a constant (Model 1), a constant and the lagged exchange rate (Model 2). Note: se = standard error, z-test = test of the null hypothesis thatα = 0.5. The instruments used are the following: a constant (Model 1), a constant and the lagged exchange rate (Model 2).
